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Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Portugal Before and After the Euro Adoption: An SVAR 
Analysis 
Abstract 
This study tried to discriminate the different impacts that fiscal and monetary decisions had on 
the Portuguese economy for the past two decades. Using different identification techniques and 
a VAR with time-varying coefficients, our main conclusions are: 1) fiscal multipliers became 
stronger with the adherence to the monetary union; 2) the ECB is, in general, committed to a 
Taylor rule type of monetary decisions that fits well the Portuguese data; 3) interest rates 
responded more strongly to inflation movements before the financial crisis, more strongly to 
unemployment movements during 2009 and less strongly to both in more recent times. 
Keywords: monetary policy, fiscal policy, euro area, time-varying coefficients. 
1. Introduction 
The effects that the recent financial crisis brought on the GDP growth trend were especially 
harsh for the Euro area. Since the launch of the Euro in 1999, and full adoption at the beginning 
of 2002, GDP growth today is far below the trend that presented before the crisis of 2009. In 
the aftermath of these events, discussion on whether the fiscal consolidation that most Euro area 
countries took was appropriate to deal with sustainability issues due to its impact on economic 
growth became a central topic in media and empirical studies.  
Portugal was one of the European countries where fiscal consolation was mostly felt after 2009 
and still is today. The country’s real GDP took almost eight years to recover to the same level 
of the end of 2009, reaching it only at the beginning of 2017. But apart from the recent recession, 
did the country gain by adhering to the Euro in 2002? From the first quarter of 1995 until the 
end of 2001, the country’s real GDP grew nearly 28%, growing an average of 0,92% each 
quarter. From the beginning of 2002 until the end of 2017, it grew less than 5%, which 
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represents a modest quarterly average growth of 0,08%. Monthly inflation, in the first 
subsample, was on average 0,24%. After adopting the Euro, it was on average 0,15%. It seems 
that Portugal gained some ability to stabilize prices growth, but on the other hand accomplished 
much shier real GDP growth rates. It gets even more interesting to see that the quarterly average 
real government spending between 2002 and 2017 was 34,9% higher than the average between 
1995 and the end of 2001.  
It makes sense to ask if losing interest and exchange rate decisions independence was a wise 
choice, but it is not possible to answer that question without knowing what changed. In 
particular, one should ask how and why the economic responses to fiscal and monetary shocks 
changed (or why did they not) during the last decades. To analyze this, we will both use a simple 
framework with vector autoregressive models, where we will employ and compare the results 
from different identification techniques, and a more sophisticated approach using a VAR with 
time-varying parameters (this last one will focus especially on monetary policy) which is 
estimated using Bayesian techniques. This last methodology will be particularly helpful to study 
to which degree monetary authorities respond to inflation or unemployment or rather to other 
variables throughout the ECB era and how is the transmission mechanism of their decisions to 
the Portuguese economy evolving.  
Making use of these techniques, we reached some interesting conclusions: in the last twenty-
two years, fiscal expansions have positive and persistent impacts on real output and, depending 
on the technique employed, we find some puzzling reactions of prices to interest rates 
movements. However, when we split the sample and analyze the changes after the Euro 
adoption, we find that fiscal multipliers are much stronger after 2002. Also, we find that ECB 
is performing decisions that fit almost perfectly a Taylor rule framework for the Portuguese 
data, except for the beginning of the financial crisis. Lastly, it seems that the ECB is becoming 
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a little softer in responding, via interest rates, both to inflation and unemployment in more 
recent periods. 
These conclusions contribute to the literature by providing a very good picture of what both 
Portuguese and European policy makers should consider when making their decisions: fiscal 
consolidations have a severe impact in real GDP in more recent years, something that the 
government should have in mind may another recession take place in the near future. They also 
raise some questions on how we think about monetary policy transmission mechanism in a 
monetary union. Because the ECB responds to combined data of nineteen countries, the way 
that one single country responds to those decisions might not be as straightforward as one may 
think, a reality that should be taken into consideration by the authorities.  
The rest of the document is organized in the following way: section two contains a brief 
literature review on the subject and also on the methodology; section three explains the 
methodologies employed and presents the selected data; in section four we briefly discuss the 
main results and section five concludes the work.  
2. Literature review 
There is a vast literature that studies this issue, in particular that tries to analyze whether 
countries fiscal policy’ stability and sustainability has been affected by the adoption of the Euro.  
Karras (2015), Fatás and Mihov (2008) and Galí and Perotti (2003) studied the different impacts 
that joining the Euro had in countries’ fiscal rules. The first concludes that in general fiscal 
policy has been countercyclical and sustainable, the second argues that it did not bring 
significant changes in countries’ fiscal rules and that national policies are mainly procyclical, 
and the last one argues that fiscal tools did not lose any stabilization power.  
However, to quantify the impact that fiscal and monetary shocks have on output most of the 
literature uses VAR models. Interpretations of VAR models require identifying assumptions 
that should be based on institutional knowledge or economic theory. The identification 
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strategies mostly used in literature are the sign restriction approach and the recursive approach. 
One common recursive approach used is the Cholesky decomposition. Perroti (2005) 
synthesizes well the advantages and disadvantages of the abovementioned approaches.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Perotti (2005) constructs a structural VAR to quantify the effects of fiscal policy shocks on 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inflation and interest rates in five OECD countries. The 
conclusions are that: fiscal policy effects on GDP are small, tax cuts do not work faster or better 
than increasing government spending, the effects of fiscal stimulus are becoming weaker over 
time and government spending has small effects on inflation.     
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) also analyze the effects of fiscal policy shocks using sign 
restrictions on the impulse responses. Using US quarterly data from 1955 until 2000, the authors 
found that deficit-financed tax cuts are able to produce a fiscal multiplier such that the present 
value of one additional dollar spent turns into additional five dollars five years after the shock.  
On the other hand, Fatás and Mihov (2001) rely their identification strategy on a Cholesky 
ordering of the variables. The order that the authors impose are such that government spending 
does not respond automatically to GDP changes. The study uses quarterly data for the variables 
private output, GDP deflator, real three months T-bill, real government spending, and taxes net 
of transfers from 1960 until 1996 for the US and compares the results from the VAR with some 
theoretical variations of the real business cycle theory. They found that positive shocks in 
government spending increase both consumption and employment in a permanent way.  
The first model of our essay will use both identification strategies. As in the abovementioned 
literature, it will have the main focus of quantifying the fiscal multipliers for the past two 
decades in the Portuguese economy, analyze its impact on prices, and see how the economy 
reacts to interest rates movements. We will be able to check in which type of conclusions from 
the abovementioned studies does ours include. 
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Focusing particularly in monetary policy issues for the US economy from 1953 until 2001, 
Primiceri (2005) uses a VAR with time varying coefficients employing Bayesian techniques. 
This technique allows to distinguish between changes in the size of the exogenous shocks 
throughout time and changes in the way these shocks spread through the economy. With this 
technique, he was capable of capturing in which period were authorities responding more or 
less to inflation and/or unemployment or rather to other variables, and also how did the 
transmission of monetary policy evolved during the studied years. The conclusion is that the 
period between 1979 and 1983 was very unusual but that the propagation of interest rates shocks 
into the economy did not change much. We will see that, with similar methods employed, our 
conclusions for the Portuguese economy are quite alike. 
From a theoretical point of view, Abreu (2005) analyses the monetary policy framework in 
Portugal between the end of the Bretton Woods system and the adoption of the Euro and finds 
very distinctive periods where the monetary and foreign exchange policies were highly 
accommodative for large deficits that translated in high inflation periods and other decades 
where those policies became highly committed to fight inflation by anchoring the expectations 
of the different agents and restoring Banco de Portugal’ credibility. Our study, with the special 
focus in the monetary policy decisions particularly after the fully adoption of the Euro, provides 
some sort of extension to Abreu (2005).  
3. Methodology and data 
VAR models that were introduced by Sims (1980) have become the main econometric tool to 
quantify the effects of monetary and fiscal shocks in different economies. This study will also 
make use of this methodology. To answer to the main questions of the study, we conducted two 
different approaches: first, we constructed a simple benchmark VAR to analyze the monetary 
and fiscal transmission mechanism in the past twenty-two years and then, to capture possible 
structural changes in the economy with the fully adoption of the Euro, we split the sample in 
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two. Then, a more complex but presumably more rigorous technique is performed to study the 
monetary policy decisions and their impact in Portugal: a Bayesian VAR with time varying 
parameters.  
The variables included in our first model (benchmark VAR and sample split) are the log of real 
GDP, the log of consumer price index (CPI), the log of nominal government spending (current 
expenditure) and short-term interest rates. The CPI used is an average of the monthly CPI’s of 
each quarter. Short term interest rates are the three-month interest rates at the money market 
and are taken from OECD data. CPI and real GDP are taken from Statistics Portugal and 
government spending from Portuguese debt management department.    
3.1 Benchmark 
Our benchmark VAR, which uses all the sample from the beginning of 1995 until the end of 
2017, will be used to compare the results with the other two techniques. It has the following 
reduced form representation: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐵(𝐿)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                                             (1)                                                      
where 𝑌𝑡 is a vector of the above-mentioned variables and 𝐶𝑡 is a vector with constants. Two 
lags are used according to the Schwarz information criteria.   
Regarding the identification technique to simulate the responses to the shocks, we will both use 
a Cholesky decomposition and a sign restriction approach since both present advantages and 
disadvantages. Using both techniques will allow us to access if they yield similar results which 
will make our conclusions more robust. Regarding the first strategy, the order of the variables 
in the VAR is the following: Real GDP, average CPI, short-term interest rates and government 
expenditure. This means that real GDP is not contemporaneously affected by monetary policy 
changes (here, measured by shocks in the short-term interest rates) nor government expenditure 
or the price level of the economy. By doing so, we are saying that the real activity of the 
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economy only responds to fiscal stimulus one period later. On the other hand, we are implicitly 
imposing that the level that the government spends is a function of the macroeconomic variables 
at that same period. Also, ordering interest rates and government expenditure (the two shocks 
we are interested in) last isolates them properly to better analyze the impact on the other 
variables. Figure 1(a) shows the impulse response functions of the real GDP and the average 
CPI to a one-standard-deviation shock both in fiscal and monetary policy variables.  
The other strategy (sign restriction imposed upon the response functions) uses a rejection 
method and it can be well defined in a Bayesian framework. We follow Uhlig (2005) and use 
priors that put zero weight on some set of impulse responses. In this way, the posterior response 
functions will be the ones that respect the restrictions. Succinctly, the strategy consists in 
drawing 𝑛1 posteriors for B(L) and ∑ (variance-covariance matrix) using a conjugate prior 
normal inverted-Wishart on both parameters that guarantees that the posterior is normal 
distributed. In each draw, one uses a Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize the shocks. 
Then, we do 𝑛2 draws on the impulse vectors and calculate the impulse response functions. The 
methodology consists in only keeping the responses that respected the sign restrictions. Our 
restrictions on the impulse response functions are so that a contractionary monetary policy 
shock (increasing interest rates) induces a negative response of CPI for two periods, while a 
fiscal policy shock (increasing government expenditure) induces a positive impact on output 
also for two periods. The first restriction goes along with nowadays central bank’s policies, and 
also ECB, which uses policy interest rates to influence the price levels of the economy. If it 
increases interest rates, the central bank is trying to activate a mechanism through which it cools 
down consumption and investment and therefore prices. On the other hand, the sign restriction 
imposed to fiscal shocks imply that it stimulates the economy in a way that creates real GDP 
growth but only for two periods, meaning that we do not rule out any possible crowding-out 
effect after a semester. The choice of two periods for the impulse constrain is in line with Uhlig 
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(2005), except that he imposes for five months the restrictions, and we impose for six months 
(since our data for this methodology has a quarterly frequency). The IRF’s for the benchmark 
VAR with sign restriction imposed on the responses are displayed in Figure 1(b) and 1(c) for 
fiscal and monetary shocks, respectively.          
3.2 Sample Split 
In this strategy, we split the benchmark VAR in two sub-samples, being them 1995Q1-2001Q4 
and 2002Q1-2017Q4 and re-estimate a VAR for each of the subsamples. The choice of 2002 as 
the starting year for the Euro is because it was the year in which Euro notes and coins start to 
circulate, despite early virtual adoption at the beginning of 1999. This is an attempt to capture 
the time variation in parameters that the Euro currency adoption may have induced in the 
Portuguese economy. Both samples have the same variables as the benchmark VAR. Two lags 
are also used in both sub-samples to be consisting with the ones used in the first methodology. 
Again, the same two identification techniques are studied and compared. Figure 2(a) and 3(a) 
show the responses of real GDP and CPI to monetary and fiscal shocks using a Cholesky 
identification for both sub-samples. Figures 2(b) and (c) show the impulse responses of real 
GDP and CPI to fiscal and monetary shocks for the first subsample and figures 3(b) and (c) 
show the impulse responses of real GDP and CPI for both fiscal and monetary shocks using the 
sign restriction for the second subsample. The sign restrictions on the impulse responses are 
equivalent to the ones that were previously described in section 3.1.  
3.3 Bayesian Time-Varying VAR 
To capture smooth transactions both between the size of the reactions to exogenous shocks and 
to changes in the transmission mechanism throughout the economy, a VAR with time-varying 
parameters following Primiceri (2005) and Del Negro and Primiceri (2014) was estimated to 
study the monetary policy framework in which the ECB operates and how does the Portuguese 
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economy respond to it. It is particularly interesting to analyze what was, at some particular 
points in time, the level of reactiveness that monetary policy authorities presented to inflation 
or unemployment, the two variables associated with the trade-off monetary authorities face. We 
will also see if the mechanism through which interest rates impact inflation and unemployment 
has changed in the past twenty years. To this exercise, we use monthly data from 1998M2 until 
2018M6. Without going in too much detail and in a general way, the model can be described 
as it follows:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝐵1,𝑡 𝑦𝑡−1+ . . . + 𝐵𝑘,𝑡 𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑢𝑡                   𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇                 (2) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a vector that contains the variables monthly inflation, unemployment and interest 
rates, 𝑐𝑡 is a vector of constants that are multiplying by time varying coefficients, 𝐵𝑖,𝑡 (where 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘) are n*n matrices (in our case, 3*3) of time varying coefficients; 𝑢𝑡are unobservable 
shocks and Ω𝑡 is the variance covariance matrix of those shocks. It can be defined that  
      𝐴𝑡  Ω𝑡 𝐴𝑡
′ = ∑ ∑′𝑡𝑡                                                          (3) 
where  
𝐴𝑡 = [
1 0 … 0
𝛼21,𝑡 1 ⋱ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ 0
𝛼𝑛1,𝑡 … 𝛼𝑛𝑛−1,𝑡 1
]  and  ∑𝑡 = 
[
 
 
 
𝜎1,𝑡 0 … 0
0 𝜎2,𝑡 ⋱ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ 0
0 … 0 𝜎𝑛,𝑡]
 
 
 
 
Expression (2) can then be re-written as  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝐵1,𝑡 𝑦𝑡−1 + …+ 𝐵𝑘,𝑡 𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝐴𝑡
−1 ∑𝑡 ℇ𝑡                                      (4) 
𝑉(ℇ𝑡) = 𝐼𝑛      (=) 
(=)      𝑦𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡
′ 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐴𝑡
−1∑𝑡 ℇ𝑡                                                  (5) 
𝑋𝑡
′ = 𝐼𝑛  ⊗ [1, 𝑦𝑡−1
′ , … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑘
′ ] 
where ⊗ stands for the Kronecker product. The driving processes of the system are: 
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𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑡                                                              (6) 
𝛼𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡                                                            (7) 
log 𝜎𝑡 = log 𝜎𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑡                                                  (8) 
This means that the elements of the vector 𝐵𝑡 and 𝐴𝑡 (the ones that are allowed to be different 
than zero or one) follow a random walk, while the standard deviation 𝜎𝑡 follows a geometric 
random walk. The innovations of the model have the following assumptions: 
𝑉 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ([
ℇ𝑡
𝜏𝑡
𝛾𝑡
𝜃𝑡
]) = [
𝐼𝑛 0 0 0
0 𝑄 0 0
0 0 𝑆 0
0 0 0 𝑊
]                                    (9) 
However, the restrictions on V are not essential and can be relaxed. Nevertheless, they are 
convenient especially because a more generic correlation structure among the variables would 
possibly prevent any plausible interpretation of the shocks. See Primiceri (2005) for a more 
detailed discussion on this. 
The methods used to estimate the posterior distributions of all the parameters and 
hyperparameters of the variance covariance 𝑉 matrix are Bayesian techniques. Particularly, 
Gibbs sampling is used to generate the posterior of the parameters of interest, which is a 
particular method within Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Priors for the 
hyperparameters are assumed to be independent inverse-Wishart distributed, while priors for 
the coefficients on 𝐵0, simultaneous relations 𝛼0 and standard errors 𝜎0 in logs are assumed to 
be normally distributed. Again, this assumptions are in line with Primiceri (2005). The prior 
distributions are then constructed using the first forty observations of sample. Two lags are used 
in the model specification and the identification assumption is that interest rates do not affect 
contemporaneously neither inflation nor unemployment which is meant to isolate shocks in 
interest rates, the variable of interest for monetary policy decisions. 
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4. Results 
First, we examine the results for the benchmark VAR. Fiscal expansions clearly produce 
positive effects on output, something that both the Cholesky decomposition and the sign 
restriction yields, however with the sign restriction the response of output is almost twice as 
large as for the Cholesky decomposition. The way prices respond to this shock, and also the 
way prices and real output respond to contractionary monetary policy decisions (interest rates 
positive shock) differ substantially in direction and size with the identification strategy. This 
raises some questions and one is tempted to admit that the techniques which yield more 
commonly accepted responses are the ones where the shocks are more properly specified. 
However, as we will see, the time-varying VAR also delivers a clear price puzzle. 
Figure 1: Impulse response functions of benchmark VAR: (a) Cholesky; (b) fiscal policy 
shocks with sign restriction; (c) monetary policy shocks with sign restriction. 
(a) 
(b) 
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(c) 
 
Since we are also interested in the time variation that the introduction of the Euro may have 
introduced, we will compare which identification strategy yields more plausible results in both 
subsamples in the case that they provide different impulse responses within the same 
subsample. If both strategies yield similar responses to the same shocks, conclusions become 
more robust and can be draw about the dynamics of the economy and the changes before and 
after the beginning of 2002.     
1995Q1-2001Q4 VAR: A fiscal shock creates inflationary pressures, although in different 
proportions, for both Cholesky and sign restriction approaches. The impact on real GDP is 
always positive but almost insignificant for the Cholesky decomposition, whilst with the sign 
restriction is positive for five quarters and then it becomes negative or close to zero. The 
conclusion might be that before the Euro, fiscal stimulus did not produce great effect on output 
or the positive effect that produced was crowded-out some quarters later. As we will see, there 
is evidence that fiscal multipliers were bigger in the second subsample, for both Cholesky and 
sign restriction approach. Fiscal expansions are, presumably, actions that pressure the price 
level of the economy, since they represent a wealth transfer to the agents that gain more 
purchasing power (bear in mind that we use current expenditure, excluding capital expenditure). 
Then, it lays on central banks’ framework to prevent that such expansions put demand driven 
pressure on prices such that inflation soars. So, another interpretation can arise: before the Euro, 
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Portuguese monetary authorities were not able to properly accommodate fiscal expansions, 
therefore fiscal expansions pressured prices to increase. 
Considering the interest rates shock, the impact on CPI differs considerably with the 
identification strategy used. With the Cholesky decomposition, a positive shock in interest rates 
makes consumer prices to increase considerably after the second period, while in the sign 
restriction strategy the CPI responds negatively for four quarters, and then it becomes slightly 
positive or null for the rest of the periods. Several studies report this puzzling reaction of prices 
that the Cholesky decomposition presents, arguing that it might be the supply side of the 
economy working: higher interest rates increase the cost for firms to get (or repay) loans and 
therefore forces them to increase prices. See Barth III and Ramey (2002) for a more detailed 
discussion on this. However, the sign restriction approach yields a more commonly accepted 
response where prices decrease with increasing interest rates. Real GDP also responds 
negatively to interest rate shocks for both Cholesky decomposition and sign restriction, so both 
techniques seem to capture well the fall in consumption and investment that this shock imposes 
on the economy (despite a first positive impact for one period when considering the Cholesky 
approach) provided it successfully transmits to the lending interest rates of the economy. There 
is perhaps also another reason for prices to respond negatively for some periods and thereafter 
positively: an increase in interest rates makes investment and consumption to decrease, 
decreasing both output and prices. This decrease in consumption and investment, after some 
periods, starts to affect not only the demand side of the economy but also the supply side starts 
to be affected. If the supply side starts to contract, there is an opposite pressure on prices to 
increase. This might be the mechanism that makes prices to shift from negative to positive 
responses after four quarters (for the sign restriction approach). 
All in all, both strategies yield positive, but relatively small effects of fiscal expansions on 
output and also on prices. It is also clear that a contractionary monetary policy decision 
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contracted output as both identification strategies present this result. However, prices respond 
in a slightly different way for each strategy. We are tempted to conclude that the sign restriction 
approach yields more plausible responses since prices decrease after an increase in interest rates 
and this does not happen with the Cholesky decomposition.  
Figure 2: Impulse response functions of 1995Q1-2001Q4 sample: (a) Cholesky; (b) fiscal 
shocks with sign restriction; (c) monetary shocks with sign restriction 
(a) 
(b) 
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2002Q1-2017Q4: Fiscal shocks yield similar responses both in real GDP and consumer prices 
for both identification strategies. Real GDP responds positively while prices have a negative 
reaction. The responses show a higher fiscal multiplier in more recent times, perhaps because 
the second subsample contemplates the recent financial crisis and there is some empirical 
evidence that in recessions fiscal multipliers gain more power (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2013)). It might also be evidence that Banco de Portugal (as the majority of the central banks) 
probably crowded-out government spending by increasing interest-rates in order to prevent 
inflation before 2002 which impacted investment and consumption. With the adherence to the 
monetary union, this direct reaction of the central bank lost effect, since ECB does not increase 
benchmark interest rates for all the monetary union in response to Portuguese government 
expenditure. This might be a crowding-out effect that was felt before the Euro, but lost effect 
after, therefore contributing to the increased fiscal multiplier.  
At the same time, although it is not possible in this framework to understand exactly how, fiscal 
expansions became deflationary. Since we specified our model in other two different ways - 
one using core CPI instead of total CPI, in order for prices to mainly change with changes in 
the demand side of the economy, and other specification including industrial production to 
capture any possible disturbances in the supply side of the economy - and the results did not 
change significantly, it is possible that the structure of the fiscal expansions itself changed with 
the adoption of the Euro, and that therefore the response of prices changed (one example could 
be that those fiscal expansions started to be directed to productive subsidies allowing companies 
to decrease prices). However, this is beyond the scope of this study.   
Monetary shocks decrease both prices and real GDP when we consider the Cholesky 
decomposition but increase real GDP when we use a sign restriction on the impulse responses. 
Summarizing, after the Euro both Cholesky decomposition and sign restriction tell us that fiscal 
multipliers increased and that fiscal expansions decreased prices. Also, it seems that monetary 
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policy became more efficient in controlling prices. This can be interpreted as a more effective 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in the monetary union than before and is another 
evidence of the structural changes created by the monetary union. However, the sign restriction 
approach shows a positive response of GDP to an interest rate increase, so it seems that the 
Cholesky decomposition captures more properly this impact.  
Figure 3: Impulse response functions of 2002Q1-2017Q4 sample: (a) Cholesky; (b) fiscal 
shocks with sign restriction; (c) monetary shocks with sign restriction 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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(c) 
In conclusion, fiscal multipliers are larger after the adherence to the Euro zone - nearly doubled 
in both identification strategies and stopped being crowded-out in our response horizon when 
we consider the sign restriction - and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy seems 
more efficient in recent years, with interest rates hikes decreasing prices. As explained above, 
we also specified the model using core CPI instead of normal CPI and also including industrial 
production index. In both cases, the results did not change. 
Table 1: Resume of all the directions and sizes of the impulse responses of real GDP and 
CPI using different identification techniques for the sample split approach 
 
Concerning the time-varying VAR, the first analysis is to study if ECB monetary policy 
decisions fit the Portuguese data in a sense that they respond to Portuguese inflation and 
unemployment or rather to other variables. This can be captured by the posterior mean of the 
standard deviation of the interest rate residuals equation (Figure 4 (a)). This graph elucidates 
that ECB makes monetary policy decisions in a way that they respond well to Portuguese 
inflation and unemployment. In other words, it seems that they are committed to a Taylor rule 
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type of policy, where they respond to rather inflation or unemployment, and that decisions seem 
to be adequate for Portugal. However, there are two periods were this was not true: before 2003 
and at the beginning of the financial crisis, namely 2008 and 2009.   
Figure 4: Posterior mean of the residuals with the 16th and 84th percentiles of the 
standard deviation. (a) Interest rate; (b) Inflation; (c) Unemployment 
Figure 5 show the responses of inflation and unemployment in particular chosen periods to 
interest rate shocks, respectively. We chose three dates that correspond to a period before, at 
the beginning and after the financial crisis. Apart from this, the dates were arbitrarily chosen. 
The main conclusion is that the mechanism through which interest rates impact the economy 
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did not change much through the sample, not even in the period of the crisis. Although all the 
responses of unemployment are negative for some periods, they become positive afterwards, 
and this is in line with the same responses of Primiceri (2005) for the US economy. Also, 
although in small way, inflation responds positively to an increase in interest rates for the 
considered horizon. There is also a small price puzzle in Primiceri (2005) conclusions, although 
for slightly less periods. Note that this is in disagreement with the responses from the sample 
split VAR to interest rates shocks for the subsample after the Euro, especially. To access if this 
was an identification issue with our model, we re-estimated the model in two different ways: 
one including industrial production growth to control for any supply side effects, and other 
using core inflation rate instead of normal inflation rate. We also specified the model changing 
the order of the variables. These different specifications did not change the results. Also, note 
that if monetary authorities respond to increasing inflation by increasing interest rates, meaning 
that they act in a countercyclical way, these actions might “contaminate” the statistical evidence 
with the illusion that higher interest rates increase prices. So, having this possibility in mind, it 
becomes interesting to check what is the response of interest rates to inflation. It might also be 
that the increase of interest rates has a positive effect on the incomes of a certain group of agents 
(lenders) that are able to consume more, putting pressure on prices through the demand side of 
the economy. Finally, if we consider figure 4 (b), it is possible to see that the residuals of the 
inflation equation are the ones with the highest a more volatile values, and therefore evidencing 
that other variables not specified in this framework are indeed interfering with the inflation 
behavior, at least in our sample. Nevertheless, the main purpose of this specific exercise was to 
see if the mechanism through which monetary policy decisions transmit to the economy 
changed significantly, and it seems it did not.  
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Figure 5: Impulse response to interest rates shock in October 2002, February 2009 and 
March 2014. (a) Inflation responses; (b) Unemployment responses 
Lastly, figure 6 show the responses of interest rates to inflation and unemployment shocks to 
the same chosen periods. This is meant to capture the reactiveness of the central bank to these 
variables. As it is possible to see, before the financial crisis, interest rates respond much sharply 
to inflation than the subsequent years. During the crisis, interest rates started to respond much 
more to positive shocks in unemployment. In more recent periods, when nominal interest rates 
started to approximate the zero rate, they became less reactive both to shocks in inflation and 
unemployment than they were before, one of the reasons that ECB had to embrace 
unconventional monetary policy instruments, such as the quantitative easing program. We also 
find a peculiar response of interest rates to unemployment shocks in 2002. 
Figure 6: Impulse responses of interest rates in October 2002, February 2009 and March 
2014. (a) Inflation shock; (b) Unemployment shock 
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5. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this study was to analyze the monetary and fiscal policy impact in Portugal 
for the past two decades, and also to partially analyze to what extent did the introduction of the 
Euro changed the relationship among macroeconomic variables. In particular, we focused on 
how fiscal stimulus and contractionary monetary policies affected real GDP and consumer price 
level before and after the common currency. We went a little further and, focusing on monetary 
policy, tried to study if the European monetary authorities are following a Taylor rule in 
performing monetary policy decisions and if their decisions fit this rule for the Portuguese 
economy in the last two decades. Finally, we studied to which degree did the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy shocks to inflation and Portuguese unemployment changed 
throughout this period and how did the degree of reactiveness of interest rates to inflation or 
unemployment also changed. 
Several methods were employed in order to reach our conclusions. First, we used a framework 
with a simple VAR model. For this approach, our conclusions relied on two identification 
methods, being them the Cholesky decomposition and the imposition of sign restrictions upon 
the impulse response functions. The discussion on how the results of a VAR may depend on 
the chosen identification technique is well known and therefore, by using both techniques and 
comparing them, we made our conclusions more robust. Secondly, we constructed a time-
varying VAR using Bayesian techniques that allows for changes both in the coefficients and in 
the variance covariance matrix throughout time.  
Our conclusions indicate that fiscal multipliers are considerably larger in recent times than they 
were before the Euro - with the Cholesky identification, they are more than twice as large; with 
the sign restriction approach, apart from also being much larger, fiscal expansions are not 
crowded-out after some periods as they were before the Euro. Although the common currency 
facilitates the event where fiscal expansions may be spent by consumers outside borders, we 
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believe that a possible shrinkage of any sort of interest rates crowding-out effects surpasses this 
imports effect (also because this import effect may have been a reality since 1986 with the 
adherence to the European Free Trade Association, for example, before the adherence to the 
monetary union), and therefore fiscal multipliers enlarge. Also (and perhaps as a consequence 
of the large fiscal multipliers in contributing to the supply side of the economy) these 
expansions in the Euro era tend to deflate prices, something that they were not able to do before 
the Euro. Our impulse response functions confirm this point of view. 
The second exercise indicates that the European monetary authorities follow a Taylor rule type 
of monetary policy that fits the Portuguese data. Of course, ECB is/was not (only) directly 
responding to Portuguese data, so this can be seen as if our economy is/was a good picture of 
the type of macroeconomic conditions that the Euro area faced through the sample and therefore 
in which ECB based their decisions. However, at the beginning of the financial crisis this 
relation seems to brake, being restored a few periods later. We also analyze the responses of 
inflation and unemployment to interest rate shocks and conclude that it did not change 
significantly throughout the sample. Interestingly, with this methodology, we find a clear price 
puzzle response of inflation to interest rates in the Portuguese economy, although it disappears 
after some periods. Unemployment has a similar behavior, although in the opposite direction. 
These behaviors are also found in Primiceri (2005) for the US economy.  
Finally, to further study the reactiveness of monetary authorities to inflation and 
unemployment, we studied the responses of interest rates to shocks in those two variables. There 
is some evidence that interest rates responded more strongly to Portuguese inflation before the 
financial crisis and more actively to Portuguese unemployment during the crisis, but less 
strongly to both of the variables in the more recent times.    
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